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INTRODUCTION 
In his inaugural U.N. General Assembly (UNGA) address, President 
Trump mentions the words ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ 21 times, assert-
ing that: “[i]n foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of 
sovereignty.”1 While most critics have drawn attention to Trump’s incon-
 
 †  A. Kayum Ahmed is an Adjunct Faculty member at Columbia University Law School 
where he teaches classes in socio-economic rights, as well as African law, literature and poli-
tics. Following his participation in anti-white supremacist protests at Columbia University, 
Kayum was placed on the right-wing Professor Watchlist for advancing “leftist propaganda in 
the classroom.” Before joining Columbia, Kayum served as CEO of the South African Human 
Rights Commission from 2010 to 2015. He holds a Ph.D in education from Columbia Univer-
sity, various degrees from the universities of Oxford (MS.t), Leiden (LL.M.), Western Cape 
(M.A.) and Cape Town (B.A. Hons and LL.B.) 
 1 Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 
2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC., at 2 (Sept. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Trump, Remarks to the 
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sistent application of the static international legal definition of “sover-
eignty”2, their analyses do not offer insight into Trump’s varying invoca-
tions of sovereignty’s foundational principle of non-interference in the 
internal affairs of a state. By typologizing Trump’s invocations of sover-
eignty throughout his UNGA speech, this article intends to deepen our 
understanding of the Trump administration’s ideological orientation and 
its application of sovereignty as a principle of international law. 
The discussion that follows offers an analytically prudent perspec-
tive on a sitting president’s appropriation of the concept of sovereignty 
and the political effects of such an appropriation. While one must take 
caution to avoid over-analyzing a presidential speech or ascribe meaning 
where none exists, there may be a greater risk in failing to properly ana-
lyze Trump’s remarks or dismissing them as simply a reflection of an in-
consistent, contradictory or uninformed understanding of the principle of 
sovereignty. 
As a result, Part I of this article offers a brief overview of the princi-
ple of sovereignty rooted in the traditional legal definition of sovereignty 
in international law. In addition, it sets out an expanded interdisciplinary 
definition of sovereignty that more adequately reflects the relationship 
between sovereignty, power, and violence. In Part II of this article, 
Trump’s 21 invocations of the principle of sovereignty are typologized 
into four categories, namely, (i) the state as sovereign, (ii) the people as 
sovereign, (iii) the rogue as sovereign, and (iv) the revolution as sover-
eign. Adopting a broader definition of sovereign power, which recognizes 
sovereignty as a “tentative and always emergent form of authority 
grounded in violence,”3 exposes a more complex concept of sovereignty 
in Trump’s UNGA speech. 
Excerpts of Trump’s UNGA speech, in which he mentions the word 
‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty,’ are inserted throughout the text of this paper, 
in order to deliberately interrupt the flow of academic analysis. This meth-
odological approach aims to provocatively engage with Trump’s UNGA 
address by inserting his voice and thereby disturbing the coherence of the 
 
UNGA], https://perma.cc/S59M-FFVC. It is also important to note that Trump referred to 
‘America’ and ‘American’ 30 times during the UNGA speech.  
 2 See, e.g., Mark Landler, Trump Offers a Selective View of Sovereignty in U.N. Speech, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/WGP4-J747; Tarun Chhabra, Why Trump’s 
“Strong Sovereignty” is More Familiar than You Think, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 20, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/T22N-JWTW; Andre Tartar, Exactly How Many Times Did Trump Talk 
About Sovereignty?, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 22, 2017, 5:53 AM), https://perma.cc/6CJH-JGHR; 
Julian Borger, A Blunt, Fearful Rant: Trump’s UN Speech Left Presidential Norms in the Dust, 
GUARDIAN (Sept. 19, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://perma.cc/82UE-E4JG. 
 3 Thomas Blom Hansen & Finn Stepputat, Sovereignty Revisited, 35 ANN. REV. 
ANTHROPOLOGY 295, 297 (2006). 
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arguments presented in this paper. This disturbance of the conventional, 
prosaic academic text is a methodological device that intends to mimic 
the Trump Presidency, which some have characterized as a “disruptive”4 
and chaotic.5 
PART I 
A.   Sovereignty in International Law 
In international law, sovereignty is often understood in relation to the 
United Nations (“U.N.”) Charter (“the Charter”), which alludes to three 
dimensions of sovereignty. The first dimension found in the text of the 
Charter is sovereign equality, which provides that the U.N. is established 
“on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members.”6 This di-
mension of sovereignty emphasizes the equality of all states in relation to 
one another as members of the U.N. 
In America, the people govern, the people rule, and the people are 
sovereign.7  
The second dimension of sovereignty can be described as state independ-
ence from external control from other states.8 Professor Stephen D. Kras-
ner9 characterizes the principle of non-interference as an essential element 
of conventional sovereignty.10 According to Krasner, conventional sover-
eignty assumes that the world is made up of autonomous, independent 
 
 4 Cody Derespina, 100 Days of Disruption: How Trump Rewrote the Presidential Script, 
FOX NEWS (Apr. 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/66YM-ULYG; Peter Wehner, Declaration of 
Disruption, N.Y. TIMES (July 4, 2017), https://perma.cc/GT3F-8CRY. 
 5 Adam Hartung, President Trump: The 5 Reasons You Are Not a Disruptive Leader and 
Instead Create Chaos, FORBES (July 28, 2017, 6:54 PM), https://perma.cc/2JTZ-MKS4. 
 6 U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 1. 
 7 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 8 See ERSUN N. KURTULUS, STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONCEPT, PHENOMENON AND 
RAMIFICATIONS 90 (2005). 
 9 Stephen D. Krasner, Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing 
States, 29 INT’L SEC. 85, 88 (2004). Krasner notes that the doctrine of non-intervention was 
first articulated explicitly in the work of EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR 
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND 
SOVEREIGNS (1758), despite its historic association with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. Id. at 
87, n.3. 
 10 Id. at 87, 105. Krasner asserts that conventional sovereignty is comprised of three ele-
ments: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty, and domestic sov-
ereignty. Id. Conventional sovereignty shared sovereignty. This latter form of sovereignty 
comprises of two possible arrangements: first, to revive the notion of trusteeship or protec-
torate as a de facto mechanism. Second, to develop the idea of shared sovereignty in which 
“national rulers would use their international legal sovereignty to legitimate institutions within 
their states in which authority was shared between internal and external actors.” 
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states that are completely self-governed and do not intervene in one an-
other’s internal affairs.11 
The only exception to this prohibition is Article 51 of the Charter, 
which permits states to use self-defense measures against an armed attack 
until such time that the Security Council takes measures to maintain in-
ternational peace.12 Krasner’s taxonomy of sovereignty refers to this prin-
ciple of non-interference as Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty13 which 
recognizes that the jurisdiction of each state must develop its own systems 
of authority without intervention from other states. The third dimension 
of sovereignty recognizes that states have supreme control over their in-
ternal affairs.14 Krasner refers to this dimension as domestic sovereignty, 
and suggests that it describes the extent to which a state is able to exercise 
control over the activities within its territory.15 
But we do expect all nations to uphold these two core sovereign du-
ties: to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every 
other sovereign nation.16 
While the three dimensions of sovereignty, namely, sovereign equal-
ity, non-interference, and supreme internal control, reflect the rules em-
bedded in international law, some theorists have been critical of sover-
eignty. Professor Peter Malanczuk, for instance, argues that 
“[sovereignty] . . . is not a legal term with any fixed meaning, but a wholly 
emotive term,”17 and Professor Michael Freeman asserts that sovereignty 
“obstructs the implementation of human rights.”18 Still, other 
Our respect for sovereignty is also a call for action.19 
 
 11 Id. at 85. 
 12 Id. art. 51. 
 13 Krasner, supra note 10, at 87. 
 14 See Daniel Philpott, Westphalia, Authority, and International Society, 47 POLITICAL 
STUDIES: SOVEREIGNTY AT THE MILLENNIUM 3, 566-589 (1999). According to Philpott, the key 
is constitutional authority; the sovereign constitution is the supreme authority within its terri-
tory and remains independent of other constitutional authorities. Id. at 571. 
 15 Krasner, supra note 10, at 88. 
 16 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 17 PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-
18 (Routledge 7th rev. ed. 2002) (1970). 
 18 MICHAEL FREEMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 208 (2d ed. 
2011). 
 19 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 7. 
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scholars suggest that dominant interpretations of sovereignty have been 
“eroded”20 and are progressively giving way to more “human rights-
friendly”21 approaches. 
Given the numerous and seemingly disjointed ways in which Trump 
invokes sovereignty– which include his assertion that “the people are sov-
ereign,” his belief that the desire to protect the sovereignty of the nation 
is an expression of love for the nation, and his claim that “[o]ur 
And above all, Iran’s government must stop supporting terrorists, 
begin serving its own people, and respect the sovereign rights of its 
neighbors.22 
respect for sovereignty is also a call for action,”23—international legal 
definitions of sovereignty appear inadequate to make complete sense of 
his invocations. Thus, the next section of this article builds on the three 
dimensions of sovereignty established in international law to consider 
more complex definitions of sovereignty that examine its intersections 
with power and violence and that more closely align with the invocations 
of sovereignty employed by Trump. 
B.   Sovereignty Revisited 
While international legal definitions of sovereignty recognize three 
dimensions, philosophical and social theorists have critically analyzed the 
concept of sovereignty in relation to broader themes of social order, hu-
man behavior, and power. George W. F. Hegel, for example, suggests that 
there are two aspects of sovereignty which he refers to as “external” and 
“internal” sovereignty.24 External sovereignty recognizes individual sov-
ereign states only in relation to other individual sovereign states; state 
 
 20 See generally Alfred Van Staden & Hans Vollaard, The Erosion of State Sovereignty: 
Towards a Post-territorial World?, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL 
GOVERNANCE 165-84 at 169 (Gerard Kreijen et al. eds., 2002). Van Staden and Vollaard argue 
that the supremacy of the state over its territory and its citizens is being eroded and considers 
the forces that weaken the pillars of Westphalian sovereignty. They suggest that “systemic 
economic and financial forces” have made states “more sensitive and vulnerable to outside 
pressures.” As a result, Van Staden and Vollaard find that “the position of the ministries of 
foreign affairs, the traditional bureaucratic guardians of State sovereignty vis-à-vis other na-
tions, continues to weaken since these ministries have to accept the growing involvement of 
the home (or functional) departments with the conduct of foreign relations.” 
 21 Jack Donnelly, State Sovereignty and International Human Rights, 28 ETHICS & INT’L 
AFF. 225, 225 (2014). 
 22 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 4. 
 23 Id. at 7. 
 24 See G.W. F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, in ELEMENTS OF THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 304-80 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet trans., 8th prtg. 2003) for a 
further explanation. 
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sovereignty is therefore dependent on the existence of other sovereign 
states.25 Internal sovereignty, to the contrary, reflects the independence of 
each individual sovereign state with respect to the organization of its own 
peculiar internal political system.26 However, Karl Marx disagrees vehe-
mently with Hegel and argues that sovereignty derives from the people, 
so that the people constitute the sovereign: 
Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives of man as the sub-
jectivized state; democracy proceeds from man and conceives of 
the state as objectified man. Just as religion does not make man, 
but rather man makes religion, so the constitution does not make 
the people, but the people make the constitution.27 
Michel Foucault further distills the debate between Hegel and Marx 
on the internal and external aspects of sovereignty into a single element; 
for Foucault, sovereignty is essentially the power to decide who will live 
and who must die.28 He traces the genealogy of sovereign power, indicat-
ing that sovereignty, in its original form, is given effect through the law, 
and that the “law and sovereignty were absolutely inseparable.”29 In ad-
dition, Carl Schmitt similarly asserts that sovereignty is intimately linked 
to the law, recognizing that while the sovereign is above the law, “he nev-
ertheless belongs to it.”30 Schmitt defines the sovereign as the entity 
which holds the power to decide whether to create exceptions to the law, 
and whether the legal system must be suspended in its entirety to ensure 
the sovereign’s survival.31 This definition raises questions about the 
means through which the sovereign acquires its sovereignty. Bruno Gulli 
eloquently framed these precise questions as follows: “Does the sovereign 
 
 25 Id. at 359. 
 26 Id. at 304. 
 27 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State, in EARLY WRITINGS 57, 87 (Rod-
ney Livingstone & Gregory Benton trans., Penguin Books 1992) (1975). 
 28 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 135 (Robert Hur-
ley trans., 1978) [hereinafter FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY]. 
 29 Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN 
GOVERNMENTALITY 87, 95 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter Foucault, Govern-
mentality]. 
 30 CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF 
SOVEREIGNTY 7 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 1985) (1922) [hereinafter 
SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY]. 
 31 See id. at 6-7; see also GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND THE 
BARE LIFE 4-17 (Daniel Heller-Roazen, trans. 1998) in which Agamben draws on Schmitt’s 
definition of the “Sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” to develop the idea 
of the ‘paradox of sovereignty’ discussed in more detail below. 
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become sovereign because he can decide on the exception, or is it rather 
the case that he can decide on it because he is already sovereign?”32  
The United States of America has been among the greatest forces for 
good in the history of the world and the greatest defenders of sover-
eignty, security, and prosperity for all.33 
According to John L. Comaroff and Joan Comaroff, Schmitt’s defi-
nition of sovereignty is connected to a system of rules and laws that give 
the sovereign exclusive power to exercise authority and independent con-
trol over the life, death, and living conditions of individuals or popula-
tions.34 Similarly, Achille Mbembe recognizes that sovereignty embodies 
the power to decide on matters of life and death,35 and draws on Georges 
Bataille’s characterization of sovereignty as the “violation of prohibi-
tions,”36 to assert that the sovereign has the ability to violate the system 
of rules and laws with the purpose of shaping human existence through 
violence and the destruction of bodies and communities. In other words, 
the sovereign holds the power to violate the legal prohibition against kill-
ing. However, Foucault finds that as the state evolved from sovereign 
monarchies to governments, the law as an instrument of obedience, be-
came less important.37 
 
Strong, sovereign nations let their people take ownership of the future and 
control their own destiny. And strong, sovereign nations allow individu-
als to flourish in the fullness of the life intended by God.38 
 
Instead, the law was used as a tactic by the state to preserve its own 
power over that which it managed and directed. Simultaneously, sover-
eign power, the sovereign’s right to decide who lives and who dies, 
evolved into the power over life itself, or biopower.39 
 
 32 Bruno Gulli, The Sovereign Exception: Notes on Schmitt’s Word that Sovereign is He 
Who Decides on the Exception, 1 GLOSSATOR 23, 23 (2009). 
 33 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 8. 
 34 John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Intro-
duction, in LAW AND DISORDER IN THE POSTCOLONY 1, 35 (John L. Comaroff & Jean Comaroff 
eds. 2006). 
 35 Achille Mbembe, Necropolitics, 15 PUB. CULTURE 11, 14 (Libby Mientjes trans., 2003). 
 36 Id. at 16. 
 37 Foucault, Governmentality supra note 30, at 95. 
 38 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 39 Mbembe, supra note 36, at 16-17; see generally, Governmentality, supra note 30, at 
87-104. In Foucault’s formulation of biopower people are divided into those who must live 
and those who must die. Mbembe uses this “split between the living and the dead” to argue 
that control over life and death “presupposes the distribution of human species into groups” 
that have biological distinctions and that ultimately give rise to the idea of racism. 
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Biopower takes two forms: the first treats the body like a machine, 
and the second centers on the regulation of the body to reproduce. The 
theory of biopower and its relation to sovereignty is an extension of Fou-
cault’s notion of “governmentality,” which can be described as a deliber-
ate attempt to direct human behavior. 40 A “government” consisting of 
various actors undertakes this endeavor to shape human conduct by influ-
encing the desires and shaping the behavior of the population. Foucault 
argues that since it is impossible to regulate every individual action, those 
with power operate by educating desires and configuring habits, aspira-
tions and beliefs.41 When the “government” exercises power over the in-
dividual whose conduct it intends to influence in a subtle manner, the in-
dividual may not be aware of how or why they engage in the conduct.42 
While Foucault believes that sovereign power has evolved into bi-
opower, Giorgio Agamben finds that the creation of a biopolitical body, 
a manifestation of biopower, is in fact a foundational element of sovereign 
power.43 Agamben reaches this conclusion by setting out what he refers 
to as the “paradox of sovereignty”: that the sovereign simultaneously 
stands outside the law, as its creator, and within the law, as its subject.44 
Therefore, states, as sovereigns, have the authority to create and suspend 
laws while at the same time being subjected to those very laws. However, 
by suspending the law – often during a state of emergency – Mbembe 
argues that the state takes on a new form in which the sharp divide be-
tween life and death is suspended, creating individuals that Mbembe de-
scribes as the “living dead.”45 In discussing this new form of state, 
Mbembe proposes the theories of necropolitics and necropower, “to ac-
count for the various ways in which, in our contemporary world, weapons 
 
 40 See generally FOUCAULT, Governmentality, supra note 29. In his introduction to Fou-
cault’s work, Colin Gordon finds that “Governmentality is about how to govern.” Id. at 7. 
Foucault himself characterizes government as the “conduct of conduct” or the forces that 
shape behavior and action. Id. at 103. He indicates further that governmentality denotes the 
“tactics of government which make possible the continual definition and redefinition of what 
is within the competence of the state and what is not . . . .” Id. 
 41 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 34, at 140. Michel Foucault con-
siders how power functions through the science of sexuality and describes the emergence of 
biopower. In his subsequent lectures, he shifts from sovereign to biopolitical forms of power, 
and develops concepts such as governmentality, and the ethics of self-care. 
 42 See Tania Murray Li, Governmentality, 49 ANTHROPOLOGICA 275, 276-77 (2007), set-
ting out four limits of governmental power: (i) governmental power is limited by its charac-
terization as a form rather than a force; (ii) the targets of governmental power – population, 
“men and things,” climate, epidemics, territory – are not passive objects; (iii) the “available 
forms of knowledge and technique” are limited; and (iv) governmental rationality is open to 
critical challenge. 
 43 AGAMBEN, supra note 39, at 11. 
 44 Id. at 17. 
 45 See Mbembe, supra note 44, at 25-30, 40. 
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are deployed in the interest of maximum destruction of persons and the 
creation of death-worlds, new and unique forms of social existence in 
which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon 
them the status of living dead.”46 Mbembe develops this argument by re-
flecting on racism, slavery, and apartheid South Africa, and then focusing 
on the Israeli occupation of Palestine,47 suggesting that the occupation is 
the “most accomplished form of necropower.”48 
 
[T]here can be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent na-
tions . . . .49 
 
Similarly, Hansen and Stepputat draw strong connections between 
sovereignty and violence inflicted on the body, as a strategy to instill the 
neighborhood’s fear of and loyalty to the state.50 However, they reject the 
idea that sovereignty should be located in the law or based on legitimate 
rules, extending the definition of sovereignty to include informal sover-
eignties, such as gangs and warlords, that operate outside the formal legal 
system.51 For Hansen and Stepputat, sovereign power can exist outside 
the law and thus outside its traditional association with the state. Conse-
quently, they call for the abandonment of the idea that sovereignty is an 
expression of power centered on legitimate rule, in favor of the view that 
sovereignty is a “tentative and always emergent form of authority 
grounded in violence.”52 For Hansen and Stepputat, sovereignty takes on 
a performative dimension when gangs and warlords demand allegiance 
from their subjects through fear, and extrajudicial violence. 
 
If we desire to lift up our citizens, if we aspire to the approval of history, 
then we must fulfill our sovereign duties to the people we faithfully repre-
sent.53 
 
Geertz supports the approach adopted by Hansen and Stepputat, 
seemingly dismissing the distinction between the state and the sovereign, 
referring to the latter as the techno-word for autonomous; an adjective 
 
 46 Id. at 40 (emphasis in original). 
 47 Id. at 21, 26, 27. 
 48 Id. at 27. 
 49 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 7. 
 50 Hansen & Stepputat, supra note 4, at 298. 
 51 Id. at 306. 
 52 Id. at 298. 
 53 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 3. 
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inextricably linked to the traditional concept of the state.54 This merger 
between the state and the sovereign leads Geertz to reject the “standard” 
definition of the state as a powerful authority with a monopoly over legit-
imate violence, and to suggest instead that “compacted sovereignty, cen-
tered and inclusive, is hard to locate.”55 In addition, Anne Laura Stoler 
suggests a move away from the idea that there are those who possess sov-
ereignty and those who do not, to an approach that recognizes “degrees 
of sovereignty.”56 Stoler’s understanding of sovereignty is intertwined 
with the notion of political contestation and the belief that there are “gra-
dations” of the exercise of power that shape the formation of imperial 
states.57 
 
The scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue regimes that 
violate every principle on which the United Nations is based. They respect 
neither their own citizens nor the sovereign rights of their countries.58 
 
These divergent articulations of sovereignty that include biopower, 
necropower and informal sovereignties, complicate the international legal 
definition of sovereignty which is limited to sovereign equality, non-in-
terference, and supreme internal control. At the same time, these 
 
Those three beautiful pillars–they’re pillars of peace, sovereignty, secu-
rity, and prosperity.59 
 
multiple dimensions of sovereignty offer a framework for a more nuanced 
analysis of Trump’s invocations of sovereign power which are discussed 
in further detail below. 
PART II 
A.   Trump As Sovereign 
President Trump’s invocation of sovereignty extends beyond the 
static international legal principle of sovereignty and the three dimensions 
 
 54 Clifford Geertz, What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign?: Reflections on Politics in 
Complicated Places, 45 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 577, 578 (2004). 
 55 Id. at 579. Geertz relies on case studies such as Nigeria to suggest that its composition 
of hundreds of minorities located in 36 federal states results in a dispersed rather than compact 
form of sovereignty which is hard to locate. 
 56 See generally ANN LAURA STOLER, DURESS: IMPERIAL DURABILITIES IN OUR TIME 174-
204 (2016) for Stoler’s discussion on the degrees of sovereignty. 
 57 See id. 
 58 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 3. 
 59 Id. at 1. 
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of sovereign equality, non-interference, and supreme internal control lo-
cated in the U.N. Charter. His employment of the concept suggests that a 
broader definition of sovereignty is required to make sense of Trump’s 
appropriation of the principle. This section of the paper typologizes 
Trump’s 21 mentions of the word ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ into four 
categories, while simultaneously considering the extent to which his use 
of the principle fits into existing understandings of sovereignty. 
 
Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty and to take 
ownership of their futures?60 
 
First, Trump recognizes the state as sovereign. He notes that the U.N. 
was created so that “diverse nations could cooperate to protect their sov-
ereignty” and that the Marshall Plan developed by the U.S. similarly re-
flected sovereignty as one of “three beautiful pillars.”61 Trump further in-
dicates that “[o]ur success depends on a coalition of strong and 
independent nations that embrace their sovereignty”62 and that “there can 
be no substitute for strong, sovereign, and independent nations.”63 
He argues that all nations should uphold “two core sovereign duties: 
to respect the interests of their own people and the rights of every other 
sovereign nation.”64 These two duties appear to complicate Krasner’s no-
tion of conventional sovereignty,65 since Krasner’s notion partially fits 
into the category of international legal sovereignty, but does not quite ac-
count for the idea that states have a duty “to respect the interests of their 
own people.”66 While Krasner’s notion of conventional sovereignty sug-
gests that states possess internal control over their territories, there is no 
mention of a “core sovereign dut[y]”67 to respect the interests of state cit-
izens in his taxonomy. 
In some ways, Trump’s approach straddles the Hegelian-Marxist di-
vide on the question of sovereignty.68 For Hegel, sovereignty is portrayed 
 
 60 Id. at 7. 
 61 Id. at 1. 
 62 Id. at 2. 
 63 Id. at 7. 
 64 Id. at 2. 
 65 Krasner, supra note 10, at 85. What Is a State If It Is Not a Sovereign 
 66 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Marx, supra note 28, at 57, 87 (Rodney Livingstone & Gregory Benton trans., 
Penguin Books 1992) (1975). Marx argues that “Hegel proceeds from the state and conceives 
of man as the subjectivized state; democracy proceeds from man and conceives of the state as 
objectified man. Just as religion does not make man, but rather man makes religion, so the 
constitution does not make the people, but the people make the constitution.” 
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as an almost divinely ordained authority that exercises control over a peo-
ple “united by their subjection.”69 While Marx, on the other hand, posits 
that sovereignty is an artificially constructed authority derived from the 
people.70 Trump’s understanding of sovereignty, therefore, adopts a 
Marxist tone when he invokes the idea of respecting the people’s interest, 
and a Hegelian character when he refers to the state as sovereign. 
The second typology of sovereignty noted in Trump’s speech fo-
cuses on the people: “In America, the people govern, the people rule, and 
the people are sovereign.”71 This of course raises questions about how the 
state and the people can both be sovereign. Trump tries to make sense of 
this duality by asserting that “[s]trong, sovereign nations let their people 
take ownership of the future and control their own destiny. And strong, 
sovereign nations allow individuals to flourish in the fullness of the life 
intended by God.”72 
According to Trump, sovereign states create the opportunity for the 
people to be sovereign. He offers the example of the U.S. Constitution’s 
“first three beautiful words. They are: ‘We the people.’”73 He sees no con-
tradiction between the state as sovereign and the people as sovereign and 
contests the Hobbesian notion of one absolute and undivided sovereign. 
Sovereignty invokes oneness; if the state is sovereign, the state is one, and 
if the people are sovereign, the people are one. However, Trump seems to 
suggest that the state as sovereign is somehow intertwined with the people 
as sovereign. But the question of course is, to which people does Trump 
refer? 
In addition to simultaneously recognizing the state and the people as 
sovereign, Trump offers a third typology of the rogue as sovereign when 
he asserts that “[t]he scourge of our planet today is a small group of rogue 
regimes . . . . They respect neither their own citizens nor the sovereign 
rights of their countries.”74 This assertion seems to suggest that sovereign 
states have a dual responsibility to respect their citizens, and a duty to 
uphold the sovereign rights they possess. However, Trump neglects to 
explore what happens when there is a conflict between the state’s duty to 
respect its citizens, and the state’s duty to uphold its own sovereign rights. 
Trump proceeds to pose the following question: “Are we still patri-
ots? Do we love our nations enough to protect their sovereignty . . . 
 
 69 Matt Whitt, The Paradox of Sovereignty: Authority, Constitution, and Political Bound-
aries 112 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University). 
 70 See Marx, supra note 28, at 57. 
 71 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 2. 
 72 Id. 
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 74 Id. at 3. 
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?”75 Invoking a patriotic love for the state is also reflected in his idea of 
the right to sovereignty, which differs from the principle of sovereignty 
enunciated in Articles 2(1) and 78 of the U.N. Charter.76 For instance, this 
notion of sovereign rights is invoked when Trump states: “Iran’s govern-
ment must stop supporting terrorists, begin serving its own people, and 
respect the sovereign rights of its neighbors.”77 However, he does state 
that “[i]n foreign affairs, we are renewing this founding principle of sov-
ereignty.”78 This assertion raises some uncertainty about whether Trump 
sees “sovereign rights” and the “principle of sovereignty” as synonymous 
or whether it is through the renewal of the principle that the right emerges. 
While Trump recognizes that each state has sovereign rights, he ar-
gues that these rights can be limited if a state fails to respect the people as 
sovereign. For instance, Trump wants to limit the sovereign rights of 
North Korea as a rogue sovereign: 
No one has shown more contempt for other nations and for the 
well-being of their own people than the depraved regime in North 
Korea. It is responsible for the starvation deaths of millions of 
North Koreans, and for the imprisonment, torture, killing, and op-
pression of countless more . . . . The United States has great 
strength and patience, but if it is forced to defend itself or its allies, 
we will have no choice but to totally destroy North Korea.79 
Therefore, for the people as sovereign to emerge, the rogue as sov-
ereign must be destroyed. However, once the people as sovereign mate-
rializes, the state as sovereign must also be destroyed because, according 
to Schmitt, the sovereign’s authority to declare the exception is ultimate 
and, thus, exclusive.80 This proposition flows from Foucault’s recognition 
that sovereignty centers on the power to “take life or let live.”81 This begs 
the question: can this power over life be held simultaneously by the state 
and the people? 
While Trump seems to believe that this dual form of sovereignty is 
possible, it is not yet clear what happens when a conflict arises between 
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equality of all its Members.”); Id. art. 78 (“The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories 
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 77 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 4. 
 78 Id. at 2. 
 79 Id. at 3. 
 80 See SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY, supra note 36, at 10. 
 81 FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 34, at 136 (emphasis in original) 
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the state as sovereign and the people as sovereign. It is clear that Trump 
is willing to “totally destroy” another sovereign state to “defend [the U.S.] 
or its allies,”82 but not to defend the people in that rogue state. According 
to Trump, “as long as I hold this office, I will defend America’s interests 
above all else.”83 However, it is unclear what he means by America; is he 
referring to the people or the state? 
While Trump argues that all nations should uphold the core sover-
eign duties to respect the interests of the people and the rights of other 
sovereign states, his speech seems to suggest that the people as sovereign 
are placed above the rights of the rogue as sovereign. This contention 
further 
 
We must reject threats to sovereignty, from the Ukraine to the South 
China Sea.84 
 
blurs the relationship between the people as sovereign and the state as 
sovereign. Trump reproaches North Korea for engaging in behavior that 
is entirely consistent with Schmitt’s notion of sovereign exceptionalism85 
and reflects Mbembe’s idea of the sovereign’s ability to shape human ex-
istence and through violence.86 Yet Trump’s threat to destroy North Korea 
similarly reflects a violent form of sovereign exceptionalism. This sug-
gests that Trump, by his own definition, is a rogue sovereign in that his 
threat to destroy North Korea is itself an act of rogue sovereignty. By 
totally destroying North Korea, Trump will also be destroying its people 
thereby further affirming the characteristics of a rogue sovereign which 
places the interests of the state above the people. 
Setting aside Trump’s hypocrisy in failing to examine the United 
States’ treatment of its own people, it is also important to ask whether his 
statement about destroying North Korea amounts to an exception as de-
fined by Schmitt. If one considers President George W. Bush’s character-
ization of North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as the “axis of evil” during his 2002 
state of the union address,87 one could argue that the exception to the law 
 
 82 Trump, Remarks to the UNGA, supra note 1, at 3. 
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has in fact become the norm, and that there is nothing exceptional about 
Trump’s exception. 
This leads us to the fourth typology of sovereignty that is not directly 
invoked by Trump, but can be characterized as the revolution as sover-
eign. Trump’s incantations begin to take on a revolutionary tone during 
the first half of his speech: “I was elected not to take power, but to give 
power to the American people, where it belongs.”88 While Trump’s 
speech is punctuated with rhetorical statements about the people as sov-
ereign, this particular declaration positions Trump as a facilitator in the 
transfer of power from the state to the people. Another striking and per-
haps surprising statement made by Trump that reflects the idea of the rev-
olution as sovereign is: “Our respect for sovereignty is also a call for ac-
tion.”89 
Trump’s call for action is made in support of the liberation for indi-
viduals “living under a brutal regime.”90 He insists that a sovereign state 
must be a caring state that upholds the idea of the people as sovereign. 
When Trump reflects on the American Revolution in the final passages 
of his speech,91 he appears to suggest that his call for the renewal of the 
principle of sovereignty should be seen as revolutionary. It is, according 
to Trump, a “[r]evolution [that is] in the minds and hearts of the people” 
and during which, “America awoke.”92 Drawing on the American Revo-
lution, Trump, by extension, is “calling for a great reawakening of na-
tions.”93 
Trump’s speech provokes the idea of the revolution as sovereign be-
cause it is a state of exception; revolution disrupts the legitimacy of laws 
to make possible the emergence of a radically different order or regime. 
By giving “power to the American people, where it belongs”94 Trump is 
invoking the spirit of the American Revolution—a state of exception—
where laws are suspended in order to determine who will emerge as sov-
ereign. The revolution as sovereign then becomes a state of exception that 
creates the conditions for the transfer of sovereign power. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper attempts to offer an analysis of President Trump’s under-
standing of the principle of sovereignty based on his inaugural remarks 
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before the UNGA. Acknowledging that this analysis is limited to a single 
speech, as well as the fact that U.N. speeches are notoriously rhetorical, 
it is nevertheless important that some consideration be given to the nature 
and tone of this speech; it may offer insights into the ideological orienta-
tion of Trump and those who surround him. At the same time, this analy-
sis has not lost sight of the performative and disruptive dimensions of 
Trump’s speech, and has consequently employed the methodological de-
vice of inserting his words into the text to interrupt and disturb the flow 
of analysis. 
The reader is now invited to reflect on the following questions: To 
what extent were the interruptions disturbing, annoying or helpful? Did 
you find yourself skipping over Trump’s words, or pausing to read ex-
tracts from his speech? Did you notice how some insertions were placed 
between paragraphs, while some extracts split a sentence in two? And on 
the pages where no interruptions were inserted, did you experience a 
sense of relief, did you miss the disruption, or did you not notice its ab-
sence? 
At a substantive level, this paper offers a typology of Trump’s invo-
cation of sovereignty based on existing debates in scholarship surround-
ing sovereignty, and suggests that there are four ways in which the prin-
ciple is employed in his speech, namely, the people as sovereign, the state 
as sovereign, the rogue as sovereign, and the revolution as sovereign. 
While Trump’s speech leaves us with more questions than answers, it of-
fers helpful insights into his administration’s understanding and appropri-
ation of the principle of sovereignty. 
 
